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Abstract: We use bank retail interest rates as price examples in a study of the determinants of price 
durations. The extraordinary richness of the data allows us to address some major open issues from the 
price rigidity literature, such as the functional form of the hazard of changing a price, the effect of firm 
and market characteristics on the duration of prices, and asymmetry in the speed of adjustments to 
positive and negative cost shocks. We find that the probability of a bank changing its retail rate 
initially (that is, in roughly the first six months of a spell) increases with time. The most important 
determinants of the duration of retail interest rates are the cumulated change in the money market 
interest  rates  and  the  policy  rate  since  the  last  retail  rate  change.  Among  bank  and  market 
characteristics, the size of the bank, its market share in a given local market, and its geographical 
scope significantly modify retail rate durations. Retail rates adjust asymmetrically to positive and 
negative wholesale interest rate changes; the asymmetry of the adjustment is reinforced in part by the 
bank’s  market  share.  This  suggests  that  monopolistic  distortions  play  a  vital  role  in  explaining 
asymmetric price adjustments.  
Key words: price stickiness, interest rate pass-through, duration analysis, hazard rate 
We  thank  Antonio  Antunes,  Christian  Bayer,  Diana  Bonfim,  Tim  Dunne,  Eduardo  Engel,  Roy 
Gardner, James Thomson, Jürgen von Hagen, and  participants of the University of Bonn Macro-
Workshop,  Banco  de  Portugal  Research  Seminar,  and  the  2010  European  Economic  Association 
meetings  for  useful  comments  on  earlier  versions,  and  Monica  Crabtree-Reusser  for  editorial 
assistance. Dinger gratefully acknowledges financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft 
(Research Grant DI 1426/2-1). This research reflects the views of the authors and not necessarily the 
views  of  the  Deutsche  Bundesbank,  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Cleveland,  or  the  Board  of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
* Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and Deutsche Bundesbank 
** Corresponding author. University of Osnabrueck, Rolandstr. 8, 49069 Osnabrueck, Germany, Tel: 
+49 5419693398, Fax: +49 5419692769, e-mail: valeriya.dinger@uni-osnabrueck.de. 2 
 
1.  Introduction 
Price inflexibility is a key determinant of business cycle fluctuations and the efficiency of 
monetary  policy.  Theoretical  work  has  proposed  alternative  views  on  the  sources  of  this 
inflexibility, ranging from pure time dependency (Calvo 1983; Taylor 1980) and information 
costs (Mankiw and Rice 2002) to state-dependent adjustment costs (Sheshinski and Weiss 
1977; Caplan and Spulber 1987) as well as a combination of information and adjustment costs 
(Alvarez et al 2010). Modern empirical research has focused on evaluating the validity of 
these  models,  mainly  using  pricing  data  for  broad  range  of  product  categories  (e.g.  CPI, 
scanner  or  scraped  data)
1.  These  studies  have  substantially  improved  the  profession’s 
understanding of factors that affect the duration of price spells. Nevertheless, data limitations 
associated with the multiproduct dimensions of the data have constrained the ability of these 
macroeconomic studies to resolve some ambiguities. In particular, (i) empirical estimation of 
the functional form of the hazard of price changes, which is typically used to discriminate 
among alternative theoretical models, produces results inconsistent with any of the suggested 
models; (ii) the empirical relation between firm and market characteristics and price-spell 
duration has still not been identified; and (iii) the sources of the asymmetric adjustment to 
positive and negative cost shocks are not well understood.  
Earlier empirical research has found downward-sloping hazards (Nakamura and Steinsson, 
2009; Alvarez, Burriel,  and Hernando, 2005). This result is inconsistent with most price-
setting theories, which suggest flat or upward-sloping hazards. The empirically documented 
downward-sloping  hazards  are  usually  explained  by  product  heterogeneity
2.  In  addition, 
economic theory has so far suggested monopolistic distortions and asymmetric adjustment 
costs as possible sources of an asymmetry of downward and upward price adjustments, but 
empirical research has failed to find convincing support for any of these factors (see Petzman, 
2000; Hannan, 1994).  
                                                           
1 Seminal examples include Bils and Klenow 2004, Nakamura and Steinsson 2009 
2 The importance of exploring heterogeneity is underlined by a recent study focused on scraped data by Cavallo 
(2011) which finds hump-shaped hazards of individual product prices in a few Latin American economies. 3 
 
A  potential  explanation  for  both  puzzles  is  that  although  theories  have  been  designed  to 
address price dynamics at the micro (firm–product) level, empirical tests are usually based on 
more  aggregate,  cross-industry  comparisons  (Bills  and  Klenow,  2004;  Nakamura  and 
Svensson, 2009). The major shortcomings of cross-industry comparisons are that they cannot 
identify the impact of unobserved, industry-specific factors, they cannot control for firm- and 
industry-specific  characteristics,  and  they  cannot  deal  with  industry-level  product 
heterogeneity. A newer strand of the price-rigidity literature, involving scanner data from one 
or a few retail firms (Eichenbaum and Jaimovich, forthcoming; Burstein and Hellwig, 2007) 
helps address product heterogeneity. But since the scope of scanner data is limited to one or a 
few firms, these studies cannot yet address the impact of firm and industry variation on the 
form of the hazard and on the asymmetry of price adjustment. Moreover, the limited scope of 
both industry-level and scanner data limits the potential usefulness of both sets of data in 
analyzing the effects of firm- and market-specific variables on price durations. 
In  this  paper,  we  revisit  the  issue  of  the  infrequency  of  price  changes,  using  a  new, 
comprehensive dataset that allows us to address the three open questions mentioned earlier. 
For price examples, we use the data explore the retail interest rates offered by roughly 600 
U.S. banks in about 160 local markets. While the focus on the “pricing” of just a few retail 
“products”  admittedly  limits  the  scope  of  the  analyzed  pricing  behavior,  it  allows  us  to 
perform deeper microeconometric exploration of the determinants of the pricing behavior for 
the  analyzed  product  categories.  The  main  advantage  of  using  retail  interest  rates  in  this 
framework is the extraordinary data availability that allows us to combine high-frequency 
information on the retail interest rates offered by a large sample of U.S. commercial banks in 
different local markets (defined as metropolitan statistical areas, or MSAs) with information 
on the key features of the offering banks and their respective local markets. As a result, we 
can observe the price-changing behavior of many multiproduct, multimarket firms while also 
knowing the firm and market characteristics.  4 
 
The  empirical  analysis  is  structured  around  testing  the  theoretical  hypothesis  of  state-
dependent pricing based on the assumption that the decision to change a price is determined 
by the trade-off between the costs of deviation from an unobservable optimal price level and 
the costs of adjusting the price to this optimal level (Sheshinski and Weiss, 1977; Caplan and 
Spulber,  1987;  Caballero  and  Engel,  2007).  We  can  approximate  changes  in  the  optimal 
interest  rate,  which  are  otherwise  unobservable,  by  tracking  the  dynamics  of  market  and 
monetary policy interest rates. We control for additional factors that could affect both the 
optimal price level and the adjustment costs by including bank-specific and market-structure 
variables,  such  as  the  bank’s  size,  its  market  share  and  geographical  scope,  and  the 
concentration of the market.  
Our  approach  benefits  from  a  few  features  of  using  the  retail-interest-rate  setting  as  a 
laboratory for exploring price dynamics. To start with, the approximation of optimal price 
changes is less controversial than in other industries, where the cost and revenue structures are 
usually  less  transparent.  Moreover,  the  fact  that  bank  retail  products  are  relatively 
homogeneous alleviates heterogeneity concerns in analyzing the form of the hazard function, 
and the fact that interest rate dynamics are typically studied in the longer term, characterized 
by  both  downward  and  upward  movements,  enriches  our  ability  to  address  the  issues  of 
asymmetry of adjustment. In our view, these advantages outweigh the difficulties associated 
with the role of bank–customer relationships in interest rate setting and the link between loan 
interest rates and borrowers’ risk, which we nevertheless discuss in detail.   
Our analysis of retail interest rate durations proceeds as follows: We start by summarizing the 
descriptive statistics of micro-level retail interest rate dynamics. We show that retail interest 
rate changes for a broad set of retail bank products are very infrequent and are large when 
they do occur (much larger than the average price change for goods and services). We then 
study the duration of the periods (“spells”) over which retail interest rates remain fixed. We 
find that the duration varies substantially both within and across bank products. To shed more 5 
 
light  on  this  variation,  we  employ  duration  analysis  to  study  the  form  of  the  hazard  of 
changing bank retail rates as well as the hazard’s determinants.  
The  nonparametric  estimation  of  the  hazard  function’s  form  uncovers  a  hump-shaped 
relationship between the time since the latest change in the retail rate and the probability that 
the retail rate will be changed. This form of the estimated hazard function suggests that the 
conditional probability of a rate change increases within the first five to seven months after a 
change and decreases afterwards. The hump-shaped hazard is an interesting observation in 
view of the existing literature, which so far has generally found downward-sloping hazards
3. 
It  indicates  that,  consistent  with  state-dependant  theories,  concentrating  on  relatively 
homogenous  sets  of  products  generates  the  initially  upward-sloping  hazard.  However,  the 
downward-sloping hazard, after the local maximum is reached at roughly six months, might 
still arise due to heterogeneity across bank pricing strategies. (If we have a set of banks that 
re-price very frequently and some that re-price very infrequently, after a few periods we will 
be  left  with  the  long  spells  of  infrequently  adjusting  banks,  and  the  form  of  the  hazard 
function will slope downward.)  
The infrequency and the large magnitude of the interest rate changes as well as the initially 
increasing form of the hazard function are all consistent with state-dependent “price”-setting 
behavior.  We  scrutinize  the  exploration  of  the  state-dependency  of  retail  rate  changes  by 
analyzing the determinants of the spells’ duration. For this purpose we construct empirical 
proxies  for  the  magnitude  of  the  deviation  of  the  current  retail  rate  from  the  unobserved 
“optimal” rate. These proxies not only account for the general interest rate dynamics but also 
allow for heterogeneity across retail responses to aggregate interest rate dynamics based on 
the  variation  of  bank  and  market  characteristics.    Estimating  a  semi-parametric  COX 
proportional  hazard  duration  model,  we  find  support  for  state-dependent  pricing  behavior 
reflected in the economically and statistically strongly significant impact of  general interest 
                                                           
3 We are aware of a study by Cavallo (2011), which also finds hump-shaped hazards using 
individual product-level scraped data from four Latin American economies. 6 
 
rate dynamics.  The response to wholesale rate changes is also strongly asymmetric: A drop in 
the wholesale rate accelerates a bank’s decision to change deposit rates, while a rise in the 
wholesale rate does not accelerate the re-pricing decision. The converse is true for loan rates. 
The  response  to  wholesale  rate  changes    also  strongly  depends  on  bank  and  market 
characteristics,  suggesting  consistent  with  classical  industrial  organization  theory  that  the 
reaction of the optimal retail rate to wholesale rate dynamics is modified by the banks’ market 
position.   
With regard to the  asymmetry in price dynamics, we not only confirm the results suggested 
by earlier papers that were based on more restrictive methodologies (Berger and Hannan, 
1991; Neumark and Sharpe, 1992; Petzman, 2000) but also take the advantage of our rich 
dataset to revisit the topic of asymmetric price adjustment by  employing competing risks 
duration models that analyze positive and negative retail interest rate changes as separate 
failure events. The benefits of the competing risks model can be summarized in two ways. 
First, we can explore the effect of covariates that increase the risk of increasing and decrease 
the risk of decreasing retail rates (or vice versa). Since these effects offset one another, their 
effect cannot be correctly tracked in a standard hazard rates model. To that end, we estimate 
separately the effect of positive and negative interest rate changes on the hazards of positive 
and negative retail rate changes. We also add bank and market characteristics as covariates in 
the competing risks models to explore their potential effect on reinforcing asymmetry. The 
results of the estimation indicate that the effect of interest rate dynamics is indeed partially 
offset in a classical hazard model. They also uncover the bank’s market share as the main 
factor reinforcing the asymmetry of adjustment.  
Besides the previously discussed contributions to the price rigidity literature with regard to the 
form of the hazard, the identification of firm- and market-specific effects, and the asymmetry 
of the adjustment, our results also contribute to the literature of interest rate dynamics. So far, 
this literature has focused either on the probability of a bank keeping its retail interest rates 7 
 
unchanged  for  a  certain  exogenously  chosen  period  of  time  (Berger  and  Hannan,  1991; 
Neumark and Sharpe, 1992; and Mester and Sounders, 1995) or on the incompleteness of 
retail interest rate adjustments to changes in monetary policy (see Hofmann and Mizen, 2004; 
de Graeve et al., 2007; Kleimeier and Sander, 2006; and others). The major disadvantage of 
the former is that its focus on exogenously given time periods (usually a month or a quarter) 
ignores the short- and long-term dynamics of retail interest rates. The latter strand of the 
literature  is  challenged  by  the  fact  that  it  uses  techniques,  such  as  vector-autoregression 
analysis, that were originally designed for use with the time series of aggregate data. The 
smooth adjustment assumptions are too strong  when imposed on micro-level data, so the 
robustness of the results is not guaranteed. In particular, the linearity of cointegration implies 
a quadratic cost of adjusting the interest rate.
4 We contribute to the literature on interest rate 
dynamics by confirming its key micro-level results of asymmetrically delayed adjustment of 
retail  rates  to  monetary  policy  rate  changes,  using  the  less  restrictive  framework  of  the 
duration  analysis.  Unlike  the  cointegration  approach  currently  used  to  study  interest  rate 
dynamics, the use of the hazard functions involved in duration analysis implies less strict 
assumptions about the time series properties of the adjustment process; thus, it is closer to a 
structural approach. The duration analysis also allows us to include more control variables 
than we could within a cointegration framework that allow us to address more precisely the 
role of market structure for retail interest rate dynamics. By documenting the effect of market 
structure characteristics as determinants of firms’ (banks’) price changing decision, our results 
also contribute to the industrial organization literature. Research in this area has so far been 
concerned with single products in a limited number of markets (for example, see Slade, 1998, 
an analysis of a price changing decision for saltine crackers; and Nakamura and Zerom, 2010 
for  the  case  of  retail  coffee  price  changes).  Taking  advantage  of  an  extraordinarily  rich 
dataset,  we  extend  the  scope  of  this  strand  of  the  literature  by  exploring  the  effects  of 
                                                           
4 Hofmann and Mizen (2004) and De Graeve et al. (2007) relax the linear cointegration assumption and estimate 
nonlinear error-correction  models as robustness checks. These  still assume continuous adjustment,  which is 
inconsistent with menu cost models.  8 
 
numerous firm and market characteristics that are used as proxies for industrial structure and 
comparing these effects across different products in a joint empirical framework. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we describe the frequency and 
duration of retail deposit and loan rate spells. In section 3, we use hazard functions to analyze 
the duration of individual price spells, focusing in particular on the impact of wholesale rate 
changes on the probability that retail interest rates will change, bringing a spell to an end, and 
how this reaction is modified by bank and local market characteristics. Section 4 employs 
competing  risk  models  to  study  the  determinants  of  asymmetric  adjustments.  Section  5 
concludes. 
2.  Empirical Framework 
a.  Data 
Our dataset contains the deposit rates of 624 U.S. banks in 164 local markets
5 (a total of 1,738 
bank–market groups) and the loan rates of 86 U.S. banks in 10 local markets (a total of 254 
bank–market groups) for the period starting September 19, 1997, and ending July 21, 2006. 
These rates are obtained from Bank Rate Monitor. Our deposit rate data comprise by far the 
largest  sample  that  has  yet  been  employed  to  study  the  price  dynamics  of  homogenous 
products. The loan rate data sample available to us is much smaller (though we are not aware 
of any studies using larger ones). It includes only rates offered by the largest U.S. banks in the 
10 largest banking markets (the MSAs of Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Houston, Los 
Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C.). Because of the 
small sample size and the fact that only the largest banks in the largest markets are covered, 
bank and local market characteristics are likely to vary much less in our loan rate data than in 
our deposit rate sample.  
The time span of our data is the longest employed so far in a study of retail interest rate 
dynamics. The period encompasses a full interest rate cycle. The Federal Reserve target rate 
                                                           
5 Local markets are defined, in the tradition of the banking literature, as metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). 9 
 
moved from 5.5 percent at the beginning of the sample period down to 1 percent in 2003, then 
back up to 5.25 percent towards the end of the period. During the observed time, there were 
25 positive and 17 negative changes in the federal funds target rate. The substantial upward 
and downward changes in the fed funds rate allow us to study the connection between retail 
and wholesale rate dynamics during a period with substantial wholesale rate variation. 
Bank Rate Monitor reports a comprehensive set of retail deposit products (checking accounts, 
money market deposit accounts, and certificates of deposit with maturities of three months to 
five  years)  and  retail  loan  products  (personal  loans,  fixed-  and  variable-rate  credit  cards, 
mortgages, home equity lines of credit, auto loans, etc.). Note that rates for these products are 
offered to customers with the best credit rating and with no other relation to the bank. Rates 
on  products  offered  to  existing  customers  might  vary  from  those  reported  by  Bank  Rate 
Monitor. The rates reported by BankRate Monitor should be viewed as posted reference rates. 
Even though actual transactions could take place at a different rate, a change in the reported 
rate reflects a change in the reference rate around which the pricing policy is organized.  
Interest rates for each product are given at a weekly frequency. The availability of weekly 
data allows us to differentiate more precisely the speed of adjustment compared to previous 
studies of interest rate rigidity (Berger and Hannan, 1991; and Neumark and Sharpe, 1992) 
and price rigidity (Bils and Klenow, 2004; and Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008), which use 
data at monthly or bimonthly frequencies.
6   
We enrich the dataset with a broad range of control variables for individual banks, taken from 
the Quarterly Reports of Conditions and Income (Call Reports). We also include MSA market 
level characteristics that are taken from the Summary of Deposits and are only available at an 
annual frequency (the reporting date is June 30).  
                                                           
6 To our knowledge, studies based on scanner data are the only ones with frequencies that are higher than 
monthly.  However,  they  use  data  from  only  a  single  retailer,  although  possibly  in  different  markets 
(Eichenbaum, Jaimovich, and Rebello, forthcoming).    10 
 
We observe substantial variation in the deposit and loan rates offered by multimarket banks in 
different MSAs and therefore use the bank market as the pricing unit and use the variation 
among multimarket bank rates across local markets to identify the effect of market structure 
on interest rate dynamics.
7  
b.  Spells 
We set up the analysis of retail interest rate durations by defining an interest rate spell and 
individual quote lines. We define the quote linei,j,p as the set of interest rates offered by bank i 
in  local  market  j  for  (deposit  or  loan)  product  p.  The  interest  rate  spell  is  defined  as  a 
subsection  of  the  quote  line  for  which  the  interest  rate  goes  unchanged.  This  definition 
assumes that if the same interest rate is reported in two consecutive weeks, it has not changed 
between observations. We define the number of weeks during which the interest rate goes 
unchanged as the duration of the interest rate spell.  
To avoid left and right censoring, we include only spells for which we can identify the exact 
starting and ending dates (the week for which a particular rate was offered for the first time 
and the last time). A spell ends with either a change in the interest rate or the exit of the bank–
market unit from the observed sample. Identification of the ending date is complicated by the 
fact that Bank Rate Monitor reports rates offered by smaller banks only if the quoted rate 
deviates from the one quoted the preceding week. To control for this, we assume that an 
interest rate spell “survives” through the weeks until the next observation is reported. (If the 
next reported rate is in week t, we assume the rate has “survived” until week t–1). However, 
in the few instances in our sample in which the bank–market unit exits the sample for a longer 
period (up two a few years) and re-enters the sample, the assumption that observations are 
missing only because there was no change in the interest rate is too strong. We control for this 
                                                           
7 An estimation bias can arise if a bank-specific pricing effect impacts pricing behavior in all local markets, 
where the assumption of spherical standard errors can no longer be sustained. We account for potential bank-
specific effects by estimating hazard functions using a shared frailty technique (see Nakamura and Steinsson, 
2008, which applies a similar approach to control for heterogeneity across product groups). 11 
 
by treating an unreported rate as an unchanged rate only if the period of missing observations 
is less than 52 weeks.
8   
c.  Descriptive statistics and key facts about retail interest rate changes 
The average duration and the average change in the retail rates for each of the deposit and 
loan product categories are presented in Table 1. The data illustrate a substantial variation in 
the average duration of interest rates across different bank products, with checking account 
rates and money market deposit account rates being the most inflexible deposit rates,
9 and 
personal loan and credit card rates being the most inflexible consumer loan rates. The average 
duration of checking account rates is 17.71 weeks (roughly four months). Similarly, money 
market deposit account rates, personal loan rates, and fixed credit card rates change roughly 
every three months on average.  
Not only do the data show that interest rate changes are infrequent, but they also suggests that 
the average retail interest rate change is very large. The second column of Table 1 presents the 
average absolute value of the interest rate change, given a nonzero rate change. This average 
change is more informative when put into relation with the average value of the respective 
interest rate (for example, the average change in the checking account rate seems very low in 
absolute value, 0.16, but this represents roughly a third of the average checking account rate). 
The fourth column of Table 1 presents the average absolute value of the changes relative to 
the average rates. For checking account rates, the average size of the interest rate change is 30 
percent. This average rate change is much higher than the average price change documented 
for any good or service categories (see Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008, who find that the 
highest  average  magnitude  of  regular  price  changes  across  all  product  groups  is  21.6 
percent—for the product group “travel”). Similarly, the average size of money market deposit 
                                                           
8 We did a few robustness checks here. For example, for the checking account rates, our approach identifies 204 
spells when the rate was not observed for a few weeks but reappeared with a changed value within 52 weeks. If 
we account only for rates that reappear within 26 weeks, we can identify 191 spells. If we impose no cut-off 
point with regard to the number of weeks a price was not observed, we have a total of 311 spells. 
9 The same has been found in the interest rate pass-through literature (see de Graeve et al., 2007). 12 
 
account rate changes is also very high (24 percent). The average size of loan rate adjustments 
is likewise relatively high (12 percent). The combination of infrequent and large retail interest 
rate changes indicates a lumpy adjustment process, which is consistent with theories of price 
adjustment in the presence of non-convex adjustment costs. 
In the rest of the paper we focus on the timing of the rate change of the most inflexible deposit 
and loan rates: the checking account, the MMDA, the personal loan and the fixed credit card 
rate. The  focus on these products which show  degrees of “price” inflexibility very much 
comparable to those of average product groups studied using CPI data (see Bils and Klenow 
2004; Nakamura and Steinsson 2009) is related to our goal to use retail interest rates as a 
laboratory for the examination of price inflexibility. The two deposit products we focus on are 
the  most  widely  offered  retail  deposit  product.  Checking  accounts  represent  on  average 
around 10% and MMDAs around 15% in the sample banks’ liabilities. Personal loans and  
fixed rate credit card lending represents a smaller portion of bank liabilities, but are of crucial 
importance for funding retail customers’ consumption. It is likely that credit card contracts are 
offered to new customers with teaser rates
10. This would, however, suggest that the credit card 
rates published by BankRate Monitor – being teaser rates on new contracts- are less rigid and 
asymmetric than the rates actually prevailing in the market. In this case, our results on both 
the inflexibility of fixed credit card rates and the asymmetry of adjustment would even be 
reinforced.  Note  that  the  average  duration  and  change  in  the  rates,  presented  in  Table  1, 
reflect all interest rate changes observed in the data. Next, we account for the treatment of 
temporary interest rate changes as an analogue of temporary price changes (sales), which 
represent an important measurement issue and are considered an important link in the chain of 
the  price-setting  mechanism  (Bills  and  Klenow,  2004;  Nakamura  and  Steinsson,  2008).
11 
                                                           
10 See for example Calem, Gordy and Mester 2006.  
11 With regard to interest rate setting, the issue of temporary interest rate changes is more subtle. Whereas a 
change in the price of goods and services that is reversed after a few periods is usually classified as a sale, such 
automatic labelling is more controversial when applied to interest rates. To illustrate this subtlety, consider the 
case in which a bank has been slow to adjust its retail rates to an upward trend in wholesale rates, and it raises its 
retail rates only shortly before wholesale rates start declining. In this case, the reversion of the retail interest rate 
to its previous level can simply reflect a reaction to changes in the wholesale rate rather than a “sale.” Note that 13 
 
Table 2 illustrates the number of temporary interest rate changes for some deposit and loan 
products.
12 These could be considered “sales” in the classical price-dynamic sense, but could 
as  well  represent  pure  measurement  errors.  Note  that  the  proportion  of  price  spells  that 
reversed  after  a  week  is  particularly  high.  It  suggests  that  we  might  be  dealing  with 
measurement errors that result from misreporting the rate in a particular week, rather than a de 
facto change in the interest rate. To account for this, in the rest of this section we will track 
the duration of spells, both including and excluding temporary interest rate changes.  
The distribution of the duration of spells for checking account and money market deposit 
account rates and personal loan and fixed credit card rates is presented in Chart 1–Chart 4. 
The distributions uncover the heterogeneity of the duration of interest rate spells within each 
deposit and loan product category. Most types of interest rates shown in these charts have 
spell durations of less than year. However, for both deposit and loan rates a substantial portion 
of the spells last for two years and even longer. For example, if we focus on the second panel 
of the distribution charts (which does not treat rates reversed in one week as spell-ending), 
237 out of 7,456 spells of checking account rate spells last for more than 104 weeks. These 
are offered by 78 different banks. In the case of money market deposit account rates, 197 out 
of 12,833 spells survive for more than two years. These are offered by 76 banks. For personal 
loan rates, only 8 spells out of 663 last for more than two years, and these are offered by 8 
different banks.  
Finally, 7 fixed credit card rate spells (out of 630) last longer than two years, and these are 
offered by 7 different banks. Note that whereas some banks repeatedly offer very rigid rates 
for deposit accounts, this is not the case for loan rates. This difference could result from our 
sample sizes. Although the sample of banks for which we have deposit rates is relatively 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
because interest rate values are often rounded at 25 basis points, there is a high probability of returning to exactly 
the same interest rate after a reversal in the level of the aggregate interest rate trend. Therefore, it might be 
misleading to call any interest rate change that is reversed after a few weeks a “sale.” 
12 Table 2 only reflects the interest rate changes that are reversed in four weeks or less. The number of changes 
reversed within five, six, seven, and eight weeks is substantially lower, and we treat these as regular price 
changes (implying the end of an interest rate spell). 14 
 
comprehensive, it is limited to the biggest banks in the case of loan rate data, and these banks 
are certainly less heterogeneous than others.  
We can summarize the descriptive statistics presented in this section with three key facts 
about retail interest rate dynamics. First, the variation of the mean duration of interest rates 
across different deposit and loan products is very high. While rates on certificates of deposits 
and mortgages change frequently, rates on purely retail service products, such as checking 
accounts,  money  market  deposit  accounts,  personal  loans,  and  credit  cards,  are  quite 
inflexible. The rest of this paper focuses on the dynamics of these less flexible deposit and 
loan rates.
13  
Second, there is great variation in the duration of interest rate spells within the individual 
deposit and loan products. A large share of spells end within one month, but a substantial 
share last for two years or more.  
Third, the average magnitude of an interest rate change is very large (much larger than the 
average magnitude of price changes for goods and services). This observation underlines the 
lumpiness of interest rate adjustments,
14 and the challenges of using partial adjustment models 
for exploring bank interest rate dynamics.   
These  findings  square  well  with  key  findings  about  price  rigidity  (see  Nakamura  and 
Steinsson, 2008, for example) and point to some important similarities between price and 
interest rate adjustments that justify our approach of using price dynamic tools to analyze 
interest rate dynamics.  
                                                           
13 Note that these products are not of merely marginal importance for banks and consumers: with regard to 
deposits, checking accounts and money market deposit accounts are the major source of retail funding for U.S. 
banks;  with  regard  to  loans,  personal  loans  and  credit  cards  are  the  ones  most  closely  related  to  private 
consumption of non-housing items. 
14 Unfortunately, we cannot compare our findings about interest rate rigidities with similar results from other 
countries or time periods, since none are available at this time. 15 
 
3. The hazard of changing retail interest rates 
Having documented the infrequency and heterogeneity of retail interest rate changes, we turn 
to  an  analysis  of  the  hazard  rates  of  changing  a  retail  interest  rate,  which  capture  the 
probability of changing a given retail rate at a certain point in time. The hazard function plots 
the  functional  dependence  between  the  time  since  the  last  interest  rate  change  and  the 
probability of another change. Formally, the hazard rate is expressed as  
 
where  ) ( t T t T P ³ = gives the probability that the retail interest rate will change in period t if 
it  has  survived  until  t–1.  The  hazard  rate,  also  known  as  the  conditional  failure  rate,  is 
computed as:  
 
where  ) (t f   denotes  the  probability  density  function  and  ) (t F   denotes  the  cumulative 
distribution function. 
The  hazard  rate’s  property  of  plotting  the  functional  relation  between  the  conditional 
probability  of  a  price  change  and  the  time  since  the  last  one  has  made  it  the  preferred 
empirical technique in the recent literature on  price dynamics. Alternative theories of the 
source of price inflexibility generate different predictions for the form of the hazard function. 
The  classical  time-dependent  model  of  Calvo  1983  generates  a  flat  form  of  the  hazard 
function, the Taylor 1980 model of regular price changes generates flat hazard with repeated 
spikes, while state-dependent price dynamic models result in an upward sloping hazard of 
changing the price (see Nakamura and Steinsson, 2009 for a discussion). The analysis of the 
hazard rates can therefore be employed for the empirical discriminations among alternative 
theoretical models. Unfortunately, the empirical analysis with this regard has so far produced 
more puzzles than it has resolved since most empirical examinations of the hazard rates have 
estimated decreasing hazard functions (Alvarez et al 2005; Nakamura and Steinsson 2009) 










inconsistent with both time- and state-dependent pricing theories. Downward sloping hazard 
functions are typically explained by product heterogeneity: if the hazard for products with 
very  different  price  durations  is  estimated  jointly,  the  resulting  hazard  function  has  a 
downward slope since the hazard rate at short durations (when both frequently and seldomly 
re-priced items are present in the sample) is higher than the hazard rate for longer durations 
(when all frequently re-priced item have left the sample and we only observe the hazard rates 
for the less flexible products). The analysis of hazard rates of a finer grid of groups presented 
by Cavallo (2011) is the only study we are aware of that generates hump-shaped hazards.   
Surprisingly, however, hazard rates have not yet been applied to interest rate dynamics where, 
given the relative homogeneity of the products. hazard function estimations are potentially 
less affected by heterogeneity concerns.
15  
A.  Unconditional duration dependence 
We start our examination of the hazard of changing retail interest rates by presenting the 
nonparametric Kaplan–Meier estimation of the hazard functions for each of the more rigid 
deposit and loan rates. Chart 5 illustrates the nonparametric hazard rate estimation for the 
checking account, money market deposit account, personal loan, and fixed credit card rates, 
respectively. For the sake of parsimony we only present the hazard rates estimated on the 
samples that do not consider interest changes reversed after one week as ends of the interest 
rate spells.
16  
Despite the differences  in the average duration of the spells across these products, a few 
similarities are obvious. For all four types of interest rates, we initially observe a statistically 
significant increase in the hazard rate. After roughly half a year, hazard rates reach a local 
maximum and slowly decline afterwards. The graphs illustrate a new local maximum after 
roughly one and one-half years; however, the statistical significance of this second maximum 
                                                           
15 Arbatskaya and Baye (2004) is the only paper we know of that presents the hazard function of interest rate 
spells (in their case, online posted mortgage rates).  
16  Estimates using the full sample of interest rate changes and those excluding sales with a duration of less than 
four weeks are qualitatively very similar to the hazard rates presented. 17 
 
is  weak.  Our  estimates  of  the  hump-shaped  form  of  the  hazard  provide  one  of  the  few 
empirical examples of an increasing hazard function for a price change. 
We interpret the estimated hump-shaped form of the hazard function as follows:  
During the first six months or so, the hazard of changing the interest rate increases, which 
implies that rates that have not been changed for longer periods are more likely to be changed. 
This is consistent with models of price dynamics with fixed menu costs (or, more generally, 
non-convex adjustment costs), which imply increasing hazard functions (see Nakamura and 
Steinsson, 2009; and Alvarez et al., 2006, for a review of various hazard functions derived 
from alternative price-setting models).
17 After a period of roughly six months, the largest 
portion  of  the  spells  in  our  sample  has  ended;  we  are  left  with  the  long  spells  of  the 
infrequently adjusting banks, and the form of the hazard function is downward sloping. 
Note that in these baseline estimations, we control for neither bank heterogeneity (across 
banks) nor changes in wholesale market interest rates nor any other control variables that 
could affect either the unobservable optimal retail interest rate or the costs of adjusting the 
retail interest rate. In the next section, we control for these by fitting a shared frailty model, 
and we present the resulting impact on estimated hazard rates.  
B.  Determinants of the hazard of changing retail interest rates 
The availability of firm, market and interest rate data in our empirical framework allows us to 
extend the analysis to study the determinants of the hazard of changing the retail rates. The 
exploration of these determinants contains, on the one hand, information on the effect of 
observed heterogeneity on price dynamics. On the other hand, by incorporating the available 
information into state-dependency related covariates we can empirically test for the state-
dependency of the retail rate changes.   Classical state-dependent price dynamics models such 
                                                           
17 A menu cost model assumes that an interest rate change is delayed until the deviation of the current retail 
interest rate offered by the bank from the optimal retail interest rate goes beyond a trigger point, which is related 
to the menu cost of adjusting the retail interest rate. The probability that a bank will change a given retail interest 
rate increases in the menu cost model because the current interest rate’s deviation from an optimal interest rate is 
likely to increase with time. 18 
 
as  (Sheshinski  and  Weiss,  1977,  Nakamura  and  Steinsson  2009)  provide  the  theoretical 
background for our approach.  These assume that a firms’ decision to change a price is driven 
by the trade-off between the costs of deviating from and optimal price (which is a function of 
the costs and the demand function faced by the firm) and the costs of adjusting the price. 
Under the assumption of  a state-dependent retail interest rate adjustment, a bank will change 
the retail interest rate if and only if the costs of the deviation of the currently offered retail rate 
from an unobservable optimal level exceed the costs of adjusting the retail rate. The choice of 
hazard function covariates that we examine is, therefore, driven by the goal of identifying 
variables that affect the unobserved optimal retail rate or the adjustment costs. In this context, 
we have a substantial advantage over the standard price stickiness literature, where finding 
empirical measures for both the latent optimal price and the adjustment costs is challenging.  
We proceed as follows. We assume that the optimal retail interest rate is a function of the 
general interest rate level. Since banks have some market power in retail loan and deposit 
markets, the optimal retail rate from a profit–maximizing bank’s point of view reflects general 
interest rate dynamics modified by market power parameters. Although this optimal retail 
interest rate is not observable, we can empirically approximate the deviation of the actual 
retail  rate  from  the  latent  optimum.  The  approximation  is  based  on  the  classical  state-
dependency S,s literature’s assumption that when a bank changes its retail rates it sets them to 
the optimal retail rate at the respective point of time. The deviation of the observed retail rate 
from the optimal retail rate can therefore be approximated by tracking the dynamics of the 
wholesale  rate  since  the  latest  retail  rate  change  and  controlling  for  bank  and  market 
characteristics.  For  this purpose  we  focus  on  two  groups  of  variables.  The  first  group  of 
variables tracks wholesale interest rate dynamics. The second group includes observed bank 
and market characteristics as measures of the degree of bank market power which modifies 
the reaction of the optimal retail rate to changes in the wholesale rate level.  19 
 
With regard to the measures of wholesale interest rate dynamics we start by including the 
cumulative change in the wholesale interest rates between the time of the latest retail rate 
change  and  the  time  of  the  observation  as  a  covariate.
18  We  use  two  different  rates  to 
represent the wholesale rate. First, we use the rate on three-month Treasury bills (absolute 
change  T-bill  rate).  Next,  we  employ  the  average  effective  federal  funds  rate  (absolute 
change fed funds rate) as an alternative wholesale rate. The former is widely employed as a 
measure of the costs of bank wholesale funding (Berger and Hannan, 1991; Neumark and 
Sharpe, 1992; and Hutchison and Pennacchi, 1996). The fed funds rate is a proxy for the 
monetary policy rate and thus the more relevant one from a monetary policy transmission 
viewpoint.  
Obviously, approximating the deviation of the observed retail rate from the latent optimal 
rate, based solely on the cumulative changes of the wholesale rate, ignores additional features 
of interest rate dynamics that might affect the optimal rate. To increase the precision of the 
approximation, we also control for asymmetric reaction to positive and negative wholesale 
rate changes (as shown by Berger and Hannan, 1991). For this purpose, we generate dummy 
variables  for  positive  changes  in  the  wholesale  rate  in  the  loan  rate  regression  (positive 
change dummy) and for negative changes in the wholesale rate in the deposit rate regressions 
(negative change dummy). We include these dummies, together with their cross-products with 
the absolute cumulative change of the wholesale rate, as covariates in the estimation of the 
hazard rate. Other possible determinants of the latent optimal rate might be the level of the 
wholesale rate as well as its volatility and the expectation of the future wholesale rate. We 
                                                           
18 Changes in the wholesale interest rate can also be interpreted as marginal cost changes. Simple theoretical 
models of banking predict a positive dependence between bank retail deposit and loan rates and  wholesale 
money market rates (see Kiser, 2003). These models assume that loans are the output in a production function 
that uses retail and wholesale funds as inputs. In other words, the effect of wholesale rate changes on loan rates 
resembles the effect of changing input prices on the prices of final goods. The effect of wholesale rate changes 
on deposit rates is motivated by the substitutability of retail deposits and wholesale funds. An alternative view of 
the production function of the bank assumes that banks issue deposits and sell the accumulated funds in the 
wholesale market. In that case, the wholesale rate is the price of output, whereas the retail rate is the input price. 
In both frameworks, an exogenous rise in the wholesale rate is related to an increase in the optimal retail deposit 
and loan rates offered by the bank. This interpretation, however, ignores a whole range of the bank’s non-interest 
rate costs.  20 
 
include the following as additional covariates: the T-bill or fed funds rate as a proxy for the 
wholesale rate; the difference between the 10-year T-bill rate and the 3-month T-bill rate as a 
proxy for the expected interest rate (a difference that we term the yield curve proxy) and the 
volatility of the wholesale rate, which is derived from a GARCH (1,1) model run on weekly 
observations of the wholesale rate.
19 These other factors related to wholesale rate dynamics 
have so far been ignored in empirical analyses of retail interest rate dynamics, which have 
focused on the response to changes in wholesale rates. Their inclusion is also a substantial 
contribution to the price rigidity literature, where such detailed data on the driving factors of 
optimal price dynamics is rarely available.
20   
The effect of wholesale rate dynamics on the optimal retail interest rate of individual banks 
can be modified by the market power the bank exhibits in each local market as well as by the 
characteristics of the banks. To this end, we expand the set of variables that could affect the 
duration of retail interest rates by including the second group of variables related to bank and 
local  bank  market  characteristics  as  covariates.  The  inclusion  of  these  variables  in  the 
analysis, on the one hand, allows us to track the dynamics of the deviation from an optimal 
retail rate; on the other hand, it also allows us to address the heterogeneity across banks with 
regard  to  their  retail  rate  adjustments.  We  exploit  the  substantial  variation  among  these 
variables in our data to explore their effects on the hazards.  
Extant theories underline the effect of monopolistic distortions on price inflexibility. Models 
of price adjustment (for example, Barro,1972; and Rotemberg and Saloner, 1987) predict a 
higher frequency of price changes in markets with more competition because the firms in 
them face more elastic demand. For the banking industry, Berger and Hannan (1991) model 
the positive relationship between market concentration and interest rate rigidity. Empirically, 
                                                           
19 The GARCH process is estimated for the differences in logarithms of the rates; in each case, all parameters are 
highly significant and are measured tightly. GARCH-estimated parameters are available from the authors on 
request. 
20  The  retail  gasoline  market  is  a  good  alternative  laboratory  for  examining  optimal  price  dynamics  (see 
Borenstein, Cameron, and Gilbert, 1997). 21 
 
the positive relationship between market concentration and price rigidity has been shown in 
the case of markets for goods and services by Carlton (1986), Caucutt, Ghosh, and Kelton 
(1999), and Bils and Klenow (2004).  In the case of bank retail interest rates, Berger and 
Hannan (1991), Neumark and Sharpe (1992), Mester and Saunder (1995), and de Graeve et al. 
(2007) present evidence of a positive relationship between market concentration and interest 
rate rigidity. An explicit analysis of the impact of market structure on the hazard of changing 
the price has to our knowledge not been presented so far.  
The richness of our dataset allows us to distinguish between different proxies for market 
structure and market power in the estimation, whereas most of the literature uses a single 
market structure proxy, such as the concentration ratio or the Herfindahl index. In particular, 
we include the bank’s market share in the respective local market, as measured by the share of 
the bank’s retail deposits collected in the local market relative to the total volume of retail 
deposits issued by all banks in this local market; the objective is to control whether banks 
with dominant market power adjust their interest rates less frequently. We also include market 
concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl index, in each of the local markets, since market 
structure can affect the price setting of all banks operating in a market.
21 
We also control for the number of local markets in which a bank operates. This takes into 
account the effect of the linked oligopoly hypothesis, which posits that firms operating in 
numerous markets will adjust prices in each market less frequently, fearing revenge from 
competitors in all other markets.  
We also include as covariates a number of bank characteristics that can affect the speed of 
interest rate adjustment. In particular, we control for a bank’s total size, as measured by the 
national logarithm of its total assets. The effect of bank size can be ambiguous. On the one 
hand, if adjustment costs have a lump-sum component at the bank level, larger banks may be 
                                                           
21 As a robustness check, we also control for potential nonlinearities in the hazard rates’ reaction to market 
concentration; we split the sample into interest rates in highly concentrated bank markets and those in less-
concentrated markets. Results are qualitatively the same. 22 
 
more likely to adjust prices frequently. On the other hand, larger banks bundle different sets 
of products, and customers’ costs of switching away from a larger bank may be higher, so the 
size of the bank can have an additional pro-rigidity effect apart from its market share. To 
avoid  endogeneity  concerns,  all  bank  variable  values  stem  from  the  Call  Report  of  the 
preceding quarter, and all market variables from the previous year’s Summary of Deposits.  
Estimation technique and results 
We estimate the hazard ratios using a semiparametric Cox model with shared frailty at the 
bank level to control for the possibility of bank-specific random effects in the interest-rate-
changing mechanism.
22 The Cox proportional hazard model is given by  
h(t│X)=h0(t)*exp(Xβ), 
where  X  is  the  vector  of  covariates  and  h0(t)  denotes  the  baseline  hazard.  The  Cox 
proportional model makes no assumption about the form of the baseline hazard. Rather, it 
explores the proportional innovation to the baseline hazard generated by the covariates value. 
The results of these hazard estimations
23 are illustrated in Table 3 to Table 6. To facilitate 
interpretation,  the  tables  report  the  hazard  ratios  rather  the  estimated  coefficients  β.  The 
hazard ratio measures the proportional change in the baseline hazard corresponding to the 
respective  covariate.  A  hazard  ratio  value  higher  than  unity  implies  that  the  hazard  of 
changing the retail rate increases and interest rate durations are shorter, while a hazard ratio 
value lower than unity corresponds to a lower hazard of changing the retail rate and a longer 
retail rate duration. 
                                                           
22 Results of the estimations do not significantly change if we do not account for the bank-specific effect and if 
we include a bank–market random effect rather that a bank random effect. 
23 Here, we present only estimation results based on the samples in which a spell is assumed to continue if it 
changes in week t but reverses to the same level in week t+1. The distribution of the spell durations and the 
nonparametric hazard estimations for these samples are presented in the middle subpanels of charts 1 to 8. We 
have rerun all regressions using the full sample of failures and the sample of failures that are not reversed within 
four weeks. The results, which are qualitatively the same as those presented in the text, are available from the 
authors upon request.   23 
 
For both deposit and loan rates, these results show, consistent with the implications of state-
dependent pricing theories, that the spells’ duration is substantially affected by wholesale rate 
dynamics. The dynamics’ effect, however, differs substantially across products.  
In the case of deposit rates (both checking account rates and money market deposit account 
rates), the cumulated changes in the wholesale rate enter the regression with hazard ratios 
lower than one, suggesting that large cumulated changes in the wholesale rate reduce the 
probability of changing the rate. At first glance, this result is striking, but it can be reconciled 
with a classical state-dependent price when we consider the effect of the sign of the wholesale 
change and its interaction term with the wholesale rate change magnitude. Both the dummy 
for a negative wholesale rate change and the interaction term exert a positive effect on the 
hazard.  In sum, the estimated ratios on the wholesale rate change covariates suggest that the 
probability  of  changing  the  deposit  rate  increases  with  the  absolute  value  of  negative 
wholesale rate changes. For example, checking account rates are 1.29 times more likely to 
change if the federal funds rate has changed by –50 basis points than if no federal funds rate 
change has been cumulated.
24 The hazard ratios also suggest that when wholesale rates are 
rising, banks are less likely to change their deposit rates (they postpone the adjustment). The 
hazard of changing the checking account rate, for example, corresponding to a +50 basis 
points cumulated federal funds rate change, is only 53 percent of the hazard if there is no 
federal funds rate change.
25 These results present very strong evidence of the asymmetric 
adjustment of deposit rates and confirm the implications of earlier studies based on simple 
probit and partial-adjustment models (Berger and Hannan, 1991; Neumark and Sharpe, 1992). 
The fact that the hazard of changing the retail deposit rate reacts negatively to cumulated 
positive wholesale rate changes is not only a strong indication of asymmetric price dynamics. 
It also suggests the role of heterogeneity, in the sense that some banks react quickly to small 
                                                           
24 The effect of the relative hazard change is computed as 1.29= exp(ln(0.283)*0.5)*exp(ln(5.8382)*0.5). 
25 The effect of the relative hazard change is computed as 0.53= exp(ln(0.2823)*0.5). 24 
 
wholesale rate changes while others do not. The observations with large cumulated wholesale 
rate changes therefore reflect the behavior only of the banks that re-price less frequently.    
When loan rate spells are considered, the absolute value of the wholesale rate change again 
generates a hazard ratio lower than unity. This effect is modified by the positive effect of a 
positive wholesale rate change dummy; however, the effect of the cross-product is negative in 
the case of loan rate durations. The following numerical examples of the hazard of changing 
the personal loan rate illustrate the effect of wholesale rate changes: A cumulated change of 
+10 basis points in the federal funds rate will generate a hazard of changing the personal loan 
rate that is 2.44 times larger than if no federal funds rate change was cumulated; a fed funds 
rate change of –10 basis points will reduce the hazard of changing the rate by more than 80 
percent.  
We also find that higher wholesale rate levels increase the duration of deposit rates (that is, 
they  reduce  the  hazard  of  changing  them),  while  they  decrease  loan  rate  durations.  As 
expected, wholesale rate volatility reduces the duration of both loan and deposit rates. The 
expectation that wholesale rates will rise, as reflected in a steep yield curve slope, reduces 
loan rate durations and increases deposit rate durations. The estimated effects of all these 
features of wholesale rate dynamics are consistent with the notion of an asymmetric reaction 
to wholesale rate changes. We will review the issue of asymmetry in detail in section 4. 
In estimating the effect of market structure and bank characteristics, we find, in all regression 
specifications, that bank size is negatively related to the duration of both deposit and loan rate 
spells. Market share, on the contrary, increases this duration. In sum, these results suggest that 
banks do change their retail rates less frequently in markets where they have the strongest 
presence, and this is especially true for small banks (suggesting that regional banks with a 
strong presence in a few markets have the least flexible policy of setting interest rates).  25 
 
The  number  of  markets  where  a  firm  operates  increases  deposit  rates’  duration.  Adding 
another market “slows” the time to the change in the retail rate by roughly 1.3 percent. On the 
other hand, the effect of the number of markets on loan rate duration is negative.  
Surprisingly,  once  market  share  and  bank  size  are  taken  into  account,  the  market 
concentration (as measured by the Herfindahl index) has no significant impact on deposit and 
loan retail rate durations. 
Note that the coefficients of the bank and market variables are statistically less significant in 
the loan rate regressions. We presume that this is the case because our loan rate sample is 
much smaller than our deposit rate sample. Also, because the sample covers only very large 
banks in major banking markets, the variation in terms of bank size, market share, number of 
markets, and market concentration is not enough for tight coefficient estimation. However, it 
could also be due to an intrinsic difference between loan- and deposit-rate-setting processes. 
To shed more light on the most likely source of this deviation (significant impact of market 
structure on deposit rate dynamics, weaker effect of market structure on loan rate dynamics), 
we re-estimate the hazard rates for checking and money market deposit account rates, but only 
for the subsample of banks and markets for which we have loan rate observations. In this 
experiment, all wholesale rate variables turned out to have statistically significant coefficients, 
similar to those estimated from the full deposit-rate sample. However, none of the bank or 
local market characteristics entered with a statistically significant coefficient. These variables’ 
lack of significance is, therefore, most likely due to the limited scope of the sample. The 
comparison of the estimations based on the different samples underscores the importance of 
using comprehensive samples and casts doubt on the results of studies (such as Hofmann and 
Mizen, 2004) that are limited to subsamples of the market.  
Estimating the Cox proportional model allows us not only to explore the covariates’ effect on 
the hazard rate but also to draw the baseline hazards so as to eliminate the effect of observed 
heterogeneity. To this end, we conclude the analysis of the hazard of changing the retail rates 26 
 
by presenting the baseline hazards for the four products. The baseline hazard rates (illustrated 
in Chart 6) show substantial differences across products. Once the effects of observables such 
as  wholesale  rate  dynamics  and  bank  and  market  characteristics  are  accounted  for,  the 
baseline hazard for loan products is almost zero. This is not surprising, given that we observe 
loan rates only for a sample of large banks in very large markets. This is not the case for 
deposit products, where the baseline hazards are substantially higher. In the case of checking 
account rates—for which we do not observe important product characteristics such as service 
fees,  number  of  ATMs,  and  so  forth—some  unobserved  heterogeneity  still  generates  a 
downward-sloping  baseline  hazard.  The  baseline  hazard  for  the  MMDA  rate  changes  is 
upward sloping, which  suggests that unobserved heterogeneity is less of an issue for this 
rather homogenous product.  
In sum, our results suggest that wholesale rate dynamics is a key determinant of retail interest 
rate durations. Adding standard bank and market variables strengthens the model and explains 
some of the heterogeneity of retail rate adjustments.  
4.  Asymmetric interest rate dynamics: A competing risks model investigation  
   
One of the key observations from the estimated hazard ratios presented in section 3 is that the 
hazard of changing both loan and deposit rates is asymmetrically affected by positive and 
negative wholesale rate movements. Asymmetric price adjustment patterns have already been 
documented for a broad set of products. For example, Petzman (2000) presents evidence, 
based on a broad range of product categories that prices adjust more quickly to an upward 
than to a downward cost shock. In the case of retail interest rates the asymmetry in the speed 
of adjustment to positive and negative wholesale rate changes has been shown by Hannan and 
Berger (1991) and Hannan (1994).  
So  far,  theory  suggests  that  the  observed  price  adjustment  asymmetry  results  from 
monopolistic  distortion  (the  optimal  rate  reacts  asymmetrically  to  marginal  cost  changes 
because of the monopoly power of price setting firms). Empirical research, however, fails to 27 
 
find that market imperfections have any significant effect on the magnitude of asymmetry 
(Petzman 2000).  
This controversy about the sources of the asymmetry of price dynamics motivates us to revisit 
the issue. We extend the analysis presented in section 3 and address the asymmetry of price 
adjustments using a competing risks hazard model that views positive and negative changes as 
separate events. Although the standard hazard function estimations indicate the existence of 
asymmetry,  pooling  positive  and  negative  changes  into  a  single  failure  event  limits  their 
ability to address the sources of the asymmetry. It also limits the ability to examine mutually 
offsetting  effects,  such  as  the  effect  of  factors  that  increase  the  probability  of  a  positive 
change (e.g. positive wholesale rate shocks) combined with the effect of factors that increase 
the  probability  of  a  negative  change  in  the  retail  rate  (e.g.  strong  market  power).  The 
competing risks model improves on this by allowing us to identify the covariates’ effect on 
each of the two “subhazards.” It also allows us to identify the variables that reinforce price 
adjustment asymmetry by comparing the covariates’ impact on each of the two subhazards.   
Generally,  the  choice  of  covariates  for  the  competing  risks  model  follows  the  strategy 
presented in chapter 3. However, we also re-estimate the model for both positive and negative 
changes of the wholesale rates, separately.  The estimation is based on the approach proposed 
by Fine and Gray (1999), which extends the framework of the classical Cox approach to a 
semiparametrical estimation of the covariates’ effect on baseline subhazards for positive and 
negative changes respectively. In other words, the Fine and Gray (1999) subhazard estimates 
present the innovation to the baseline subhazard caused by a unit of the covariate.
26  
The results of the competing risks models for the positive and negative changes in each of the 
four retail rates are presented in tables 7 to 10. These results show that a positive (negative) 
                                                           
26  Unfortunately,  the  classical  identification  challenges  demonstrated  by  Heckman  and  Honore  (1998)  and 
Honore  and  Lleras-Muney  (2006)  challenge  the  exploration  of  the  other  key  question  that  could  also  have 
enabled  us  to  relate  the  asymmetry  of  interest  rate  adjustments  to  heterogeneous  adjustment  costs,  such  as 
analyzing whether banks at high risk of one type of failure (positive) are also at high risk for the other (negative), 
even after controlling for covariates. 28 
 
wholesale rate change positively affects the probability of a positive (negative) retail rate 
change. Also, a negative (positive) wholesale rate change negatively affects the probability of 
a  positive  (negative)  retail  rate  change.  Thus,  the  asymmetry  emerges  from  the  different 
magnitudes  of  the  effect  of  positive  and  negative  wholesale  rate  changes.  In  the  case  of 
deposit rates, the effect of negative wholesale rate changes is stronger than that of positive 
rate changes. The opposite is true for loan rates.  
So the hazard of positive deposit rate changes is only slightly increased in the case of positive 
wholesale rate changes. For example, a 0.5 percent cumulative change in the federal funds 
rate generates the hazard of a positive checking account rate change that is 1.03
27 times larger 
than the baseline hazard. However, a negative wholesale rate change tremendously increases 
the probability (all else being equal) of a negative deposit rate change. For example, a –0.5 
percent  cumulative  change  in  the  federal  funds  rate  generates  the  hazard  of  a  negative 
checking  account  rate  change  that  is  2.27
28  times  larger  than  the  baseline  hazard).  The 
asymmetry is less pronounced in the case of loan rate changes, which, according to the results 
presented in table 9 and table 10, react with an increased probability of mild positive changes 
in the cumulated wholesale rate change. For example, a positive federal funds rate change of 
0.25 generates the hazard of a positive loan rate change that is 1.08 times higher than the 
baseline hazard, whereas a fed funds rate change of 0.5 induces a hazard that is 0.79 times the 
baseline  hazard.
29  Negative  interest  rate  changes  substantially  decrease  the  probability  of 
changing the loan rates. 
The fact that the hazard function estimates from section 3 showed that positive wholesale rate 
changes decrease the probability of a deposit rate change, then, reflects the offsetting of the 
increase in the hazard of positive changes by the decrease in the negative changes hazard, 
caused by a rise in the wholesale rate level.  
                                                           
27 The effect of the relative subhazard change is computed as 1.03=exp(ln(0.935)*0.5)*exp(ln(0.001)*0.5). 
28 The effect of the relative subhazard change is computed as 2.27= 
exp(ln(0.271)*0.5)*1.699*exp(ln(6.567)*0.5). 
29  Note  that  a  smaller  effect  of  larger  values  of  the  cumulated  wholesale  rate  change  could  result  from 
heterogeneity, since banks that have not adjusted to smaller changes are less likely to adjust later on. 29 
 
Among the market-structure and bank-specific control variables, we find that bank size and 
market concentration do not substantially affect the asymmetry (they reduce the probability of 
deposit rate increases slightly more than those of deposit rate increase). Market share, on the 
other hand, has a very important, strong asymmetry-reinforcing effect. These results support 
the  hypothesis  of  a  market-power-driven  asymmetry  as  suggested  by  the  theory.  They 
challenge earlier results, which used industry level measures of market distortions and so 
failed  to  identify  the  role  of  firm-level  market  power  in  reinforcing  asymmetric  price 
dynamics.  The  different  signs  of  the  impact  of  bank  size,  market  share,  and  market 
concentration also suggest a complex interaction between bank and market characteristics, 
which explains the failure of studies based on less detailed data to uncover a relation between 
monopolistic distortions and asymmetric price dynamics.  
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine a novel dataset on retail interest rates and use it as an example of 
retail prices to explore several aspects of price-setting behavior.  We study the functional form 
of  the  hazard  of  changing  a  price,  the  reaction  of  this  hazard  to  firm  and  market 
characteristics, and the sources of price dynamics’ asymmetry. The major advantage of using 
retail deposit rates as price examples is the extraordinary richness of available data, which 
allows  us  to  explore  the  effect  of  product-,  firm-  and  market-level  characteristics  on  the 
duration of price spells in a uniform analytical framework.  
We  find  that  retail  interest  rates,  such  as  checking  account  rates,  money  market  deposit 
account rates, personal loan rates, and fixed credit card rates, have a mean duration in the 
range of three to four months. The estimated hazard function of changing the retail rates 
increases for roughly the first six months and decreases after that. The hazard is significantly 
affected by bank and market structure characteristics. And last but not least, the effect of 
money market interest rate dynamics on retail interest rates is strongly asymmetrical, and the 
magnitude of the asymmetry is related to monopolistic distortions. 30 
 
These results contribute substantially to the price rigidity literature which has, so far, used less 
detailed data that do not allow identification either of the relation between firm and market 
characteristics  and  the  hazard  of  price  changes  or  of  the  sources  of  price  adjustment 
asymmetries. Besides contributing to the price rigidity literature, our analysis contributes to 
the literature on interest rate dynamics by overcoming the econometric pitfalls associated with 
the  use  of  smooth  adjustment  techniques  such  as  cointegration  in  analyzing  interest  rate 
dynamics, which is obviously characterized by lumpy adjustments.  
Two policy implications emerge from our results. First, the documented state-dependency of 
retail rate dynamics suggests important implications for aggregate interest rate dynamics by 
proposing that those banks with the largest deviation from the optimum are most likely to 
adjust their retail rates. Policies targeting a change in the retail rate should, therefore, account 
for the distribution of the deviations from the optimum rate for the population of banks as 
well as  for the possibility that a substantial share of banks may not react at all to a monetary 
policy  rate  change  if  such  a  change  does  not  shift  their  optimal  retail  rate  substantially. 
Second, by illustrating the role of market structure in the retail rate adjustment process, we 
show the importance of bank market structure dynamics for monetary policy transmission.   
Our analysis in this paper could be characterized as “reduced form,” in the sense that the 
estimates have few structural interpretations. However, the hazard functions that we estimate 
provide a point of departure to a variety of structural extensions, such as exploration of the 
effect of lumpy, bank-level interest rate adjustments on aggregate interest rate dynamics and 
the empirical estimation of the magnitude of the adjustment costs. Further, because our results 
suggest  the  importance  of  unobserved  heterogeneity  in  determining  price  changes,  our 
estimating approach can easily be expanded to include unobserved heterogeneity of a known 
parametric form.  
All of this suggests that duration analysis, along with our high-frequency data, can be an 
important  first  step  towards  developing  a  structural  model  of  interest-rate  determination. 31 
 
Constructing such a model is a scheduled extension of this research project. Potentially, these 
results point to important similarities between the microeconometric properties of price and 
interest-rate  dynamics,  which  can  be  employed  in  modeling  the  mechanism  of  monetary 
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checking accounts 17.71 0.16 0.53 0.30
MMDA 12.76 0.26 1.07 0.24
CD 3 months 7.87 0.33 2.33 0.14
CD 12 months 6.08 0.35 2.96 0.12
loans
auto loan 9.87 0.87 7.67 0.11
arm 1 year 4.88 0.52 3.82 0.14
heloc 8.15 0.60 12.32 0.05
mortgage 15 years 3.34 0.25 5.83 0.04
personal  11.13 1.47 12.32 0.12
fixed credit card 10.08 0.87 7.56 0.12 
Source: Authors’ computations based on BankRate Monitor data. 35 
 












number of  
"sales" with 2 
weeks 
duration
number of  
"sales" with 3 
weeks 
duration
number of  




cheching account 8084 5714 628 149 107 70
MMDA 14433 11814 1600 240 257 103
loans
personal  797 642 134 48 20 12
fixed credit card 709 565 79 21 12 15 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on BankRate Monitor data. 36 
 










absolute change wholesale rate 0.1100 *** 0.0070 0.2823 *** 0.0109
dummy for negative change 1.0301 0.0438 1.3760 ** 0.0506
negative change*absolute change 5.8382 *** 0.4216 5.2885 *** 0.3757
wholesale rate 0.8664 *** 0.0225 0.9182 *** 0.0226
yield curve 0.6445 *** 0.0253 0.6879 *** 0.0262
wholesale rate volatility 6.0930 *** 1.0410 1.0006 *** 0.0000
bank size 1.0684 ** 0.0139 1.0978 *** 0.0141
herfindahl 1.3528 0.2922 1.4203 0.3130
market share  0.6672 *** 0.1074 0.6562 ** 0.1050
number of markets 0.9888 *** 0.0012 0.9855 *** 0.0011
# Observations 138417 138652
# spells  6483 6483
LR Chi(2) 736.37 638.71
wholesale rate=T-Bill 3  wholesale rate=Fed 
 
Note: COX proportional semi-parametric estimation of the hazard of changing the retail rate based on a sample 
of spells considering only changes which are not reversed within one week as spell “ends”. Hazard ratios higher 
than unity imply an increased hazard of changing the retail rate. Hazard ratios lower than unity imply a lower 
probability of changing the retail rate and thus more rigid retail rates. 37 
 
Table 4: Wholesale rate changes and the hazard of changing the money market deposit account rate: 









absolute change wholesale rate 0.524 *** 0.018 0.184 *** 0.006
dummy for negative change 1.669 *** 0.046 0.914 ** 0.023
negative change*absolute change 0.089 *** 0.006 9.301 *** 0.581
wholesale rate 0.853 *** 0.016 0.889 *** 0.015
yield curve 0.632 *** 0.016 0.657 *** 0.017
wholesale rate volatility 2.491 *** 1.021 4.822 *** 1.137
bank size 1.080 *** 0.010 1.079 *** 0.010
herfindahl 0.832 0.132 0.836 0.132
market share  0.924 0.103 0.952 0.105
number of markets 0.989 *** 0.001 0.988 *** 0.001
# Observations 160188 160188
# spells  9105 9105
LR Chi(2) 7361.05 4745.07
wholesale rate=T-Bill 3  wholesale rate=Fed 
 
Note: COX proportional semi-parametric estimation of the hazard of changing the retail rate based on a sample 
of spells considering only changes which are not reversed within one week as spell “ends”. Hazard ratios higher 
than unity imply an increased hazard of changing the retail rate. Hazard ratios lower than unity imply a lower 
probability of changing the retail rate and thus more rigid retail rates.  
 38 
 










absolute change wholesale rate 0.412 *** 0.063 0.714 *** 0.070
dummy for positive change 3.992 *** 0.499 4.221 *** 0.512
positive change*absolute change 0.019 *** 0.012 0.010 *** 0.006
wholesale rate 1.290 *** 0.111 1.576 *** 0.124
yield curve 1.568 *** 0.186 2.077 *** 0.251
wholesale rate volatility 7.050 12.400 7.316 *** 10.544
bank size 1.076 * 0.051 1.079 * 0.049
herfindahl 0.614 0.609 0.579 0.579
market share  0.076 *** 0.043 0.065 0.037
number of markets 1.020 *** 0.003 1.022 ** 0.003
# Observations 4862 5582
# spells  527 625
LR Chi(2) 498.03 367.98
wholesale rate=T-Bill 3  wholesale rate=Fed funds 
 
Note: COX proportional semi-parametric estimation of the hazard of changing the retail rate based on a sample 
of spells considering only changes which are not reversed within one week as spell “ends”. Hazard ratios higher 
than unity imply an increased hazard of changing the retail rate. Hazard ratios lower than unity imply a lower 
probability of changing the retail rate and thus more rigid retail rates. 39 
 









absolute change wholesale rate 0.159 *** 0.036 0.568 *** 0.068
dummy for positive change 2.503 *** 0.327 1.890 *** 0.225
positive change*absolute change 0.003 *** 0.002 0.000 *** 0.000
wholesale rate 2.375 *** 0.224 1.872 *** 0.154
yield curve 2.270 *** 0.298 1.787 *** 0.229
wholesale rate volatility 1.694 *** 1.024 1.000 *** 0.000
bank size 1.122 ** 0.051 1.091 * 0.049
herfindahl 0.917 0.814 0.555 0.479
market share  0.724 0.390 1.013 0.549
number of markets 1.005 ** 0.003 1.006 ** 0.003
# Observations 4982 4982
# spells  543 543
LR Chi(2) 529.72 277.95
wholesale rate=T-Bill 3 month  wholesale rate=Fed funds 
 
Note: COX proportional semi-parametric estimation of the hazard of changing the retail rate based on a sample 
of spells considering only changes which are not reversed within one week as spell “ends”. Hazard ratios higher 
than unity imply an increased hazard of changing the retail rate. Hazard ratios lower than unity imply a lower 
probability of changing the retail rate and thus more rigid retail rates. 40 
 

















absolute change wholesale rate 0.289 *** 0.021 0.244 *** 0.059 0.382 *** 0.025 0.276 *** 0.037
dummy for negative change 0.836 * 0.085 0.990 0.130
negative change*absolute change 0.844 0.214 0.339 * 0.214
dummy for positive change 1.197 * 0.122 1.079 0.101
positive change*absolute change 1.185 0.301 2.783 ** 1.239
wholesale rate 0.725 *** 0.042 0.725 *** 0.042 0.796 *** 0.045 0.841 *** 0.052
yield curve 0.574 *** 0.051 0.574 *** 0.051 0.684 *** 0.061 0.701 *** 0.066
wholesale rate volatility 0.000 *** 0.000 7.090 *** 2.050 1.000 *** 0.000 1.000 *** 0.000
bank size 1.125 *** 0.029 1.125 *** 0.029 1.136 *** 0.030 1.138 *** 0.030
herfindahl 2.493 ** 0.980 2.493 ** 0.980 2.346 ** 0.918 2.411 ** 0.940
market share  0.530 * 0.193 0.530 * 0.193 0.524 * 0.189 0.522 * 0.188
number of markets 0.981 *** 0.002 0.981 *** 0.002 0.979 *** 0.002 0.979 *** 0.002
# Observations 138417 138417 138417 138417
# failures 979 979 979 979

















absolute change wholesale rate 0.044 0.006 0.702 *** 0.028 0.271 *** 0.012 0.935 *** 0.025
dummy for negative change 1.060 0.059 1.699 *** 0.080
negative change*absolute change 15.810 2.278 6.567 *** 0.488
dummy for positive change 0.944 0.053 1.071 0.049
positive change*absolute change 0.063 *** 0.009 0.000 *** 0.000
wholesale rate 0.936 0.033 0.936 ** 0.033 0.977 *** 0.030 0.735 *** 0.024
yield curve 0.697 0.036 0.697 *** 0.036 0.727 *** 0.035 0.541 *** 0.026
wholesale rate volatility 2.600 1.110 2.600 *** 1.100 1.001 *** 0.000 1.001 *** 0.000
bank size 1.061 0.015 1.061 *** 0.015 1.094 *** 0.015 1.080 *** 0.015
herfindahl 1.130 0.287 1.130 0.287 1.175 0.312 1.064 0.278
market share  0.682 0.131 0.682 ** 0.131 0.682 *** 0.129 0.712 * 0.136
number of markets 0.990 0.001 0.990 *** 0.001 0.987 *** 0.001 0.989 *** 0.001
# Observations 138417 138417 138417 138417
# failures 3162 3162 3162 3162
LR Chi(2) 2327.08 2327.09 3435.66 1557.88
wholesale rate=Fed funds rate
Positive change hazard
wholesale rate=T-Bill 3 month rate  wholesale rate=Fed funds rate
Negative change hazard
wholesale rate=T-Bill 3 month rate 
 
Note: Semi-parametric estimation of the subhazards of positive and negative retail rate changes based on a sample of spells considering only changes which are not reversed 
within one week as spell “ends”. Hazard ratios higher than unity imply an increased hazard of changing the retail rate. Hazard ratios lower than unity imply a lower probability of 
changing the retail rate and thus more rigid retail rates. 41 
 

















absolute change wholesale rate 0.120 *** 0.008 0.489 *** 0.074 0.203 *** 0.011 0.749 *** 0.065
dummy for negative change 0.217 *** 0.016 0.339 *** 0.026
negative change*absolute change 4.094 *** 0.689 3.919 *** 1.271
dummy for positive change 4.609 *** 0.330 3.987 *** 0.271
positive change*absolute change 0.244 *** 0.041 0.227 *** 0.024
wholesale rate 0.719 *** 0.025 0.719 *** 0.025 0.751 *** 0.024 0.739 *** 0.024
yield curve 0.507 *** 0.024 0.507 *** 0.024 0.513 *** 0.025 0.500 *** 0.025
wholesale rate volatility 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.192 1.285 0.720 0.764
bank size 1.053 *** 0.017 1.053 *** 0.017 1.035 ** 0.017 1.033 ** 0.017
herfindahl 0.995 0.279 0.995 0.279 1.043 0.284 1.030 0.281
market share  0.876 0.177 0.876 0.177 0.798 0.160 0.776 0.156
number of markets 0.991 *** 0.001 0.991 *** 0.001 0.991 *** 0.001 0.992 *** 0.001
# Observations 160188 160188 160188 160188
# failures 3362 3362 3362 3362

















absolute change wholesale rate 0.011 *** 0.002 0.559 *** 0.022 0.191 *** 0.009 0.877 *** 0.020
dummy for negative change 0.848 *** 0.032 *** 1.427 *** 0.049
negative change*absolute change 51.526 *** 9.208 *** 10.365 *** 1.021
dummy for positive change 1.179 0.044 1.153 *** 0.038
positive change*absolute change 0.019 0.003 0.034 *** 0.004
wholesale rate 0.971 0.024 0.971 0.024 0.995 0.021 0.938 *** 0.022
yield curve 0.762 *** 0.026 0.762 *** 0.026 0.784 *** 0.026 0.735 *** 0.025
wholesale rate volatility 6.200 *** 1.760 6.200 *** 1.760 6.980 *** 1.737 3.153 *** 7.451
bank size 1.098 *** 0.013 1.098 *** 0.013 1.105 *** 0.013 1.098 *** 0.012
herfindahl 0.793 0.166 0.793 0.166 0.741 0.156 0.787 0.163
market share  0.862 0.123 0.862 0.123 0.958 0.137 0.793 * 0.114
number of markets 0.987 *** 0.001 0.987 *** 0.001 0.987 *** 0.001 0.988 *** 0.001
# Observations 160188 160188 160188 160188
# failures 5690 5690 5690 5690
LR Chi(2) 4295.08 4295.9 4110.18 2233.13
Positive change hazard
wholesale rate=T-Bill 3 month rate  wholesale rate=Fed funds rate
Negative change hazard
wholesale rate=T-Bill 3 month rate  wholesale rate=Fed funds rate
 
Note: Semi-parametric estimation of the subhazards of positive and negative retail rate changes based on a sample of spells considering only changes which are not reversed 
within one week as spell “ends”. Hazard ratios higher than unity imply an increased hazard of changing the retail rate. Hazard ratios lower than unity imply a lower probability of 
changing the retail rate and thus more rigid retail rates. 42 
 

















absolute change wholesale rate 0.129 * 0.145 0.124 *** 0.089 0.158 *** 0.106 0.184 *** 0.091
dummy for negative change 0.338 *** 0.104 0.606 * 0.161
negative change*absolute change 0.961 1.326 1.161 0.991
dummy for positive change 2.957 *** 0.912 1.650 ** 0.439
positive change*absolute change 1.041 1.437 0.861 0.735
wholesale rate 0.839 0.174 0.839 0.174 1.496 *** 0.237 1.496 ** 0.237
yield curve 0.810 0.234 0.810 0.234 1.779 ** 0.444 1.779 ** 0.444
wholesale rate volatility 0.343 9.757 0.343 9.757 1.425 3.996 1.425 3.996
bank size 1.043 0.099 1.043 0.099 1.058 0.094 1.058 0.094
herfindahl 1.075 2.257 1.075 2.257 1.499 3.179 1.499 3.179
market share  0.293 0.348 0.293 0.348 0.282 0.345 0.282 0.345
number of markets 1.020 *** 0.008 1.020 0.008 1.022 *** 0.007 1.022 *** 0.007
# Observations 4862 4862 4862 4862
# failures 149 149 149 149

















absolute change wholesale rate 0.025 0.072 0.166 0.267 0.000 ** 0.000 0.505 0.311
dummy for negative change 0.189 *** 0.104 0.150 *** 0.066
negative change*absolute change 6.596 21.995 8393.370 ** 33814.140
dummy for positive change 5.295 *** 2.911 6.654 *** 2.922
positive change*absolute change 0.152 0.506 0.000 ** 0.000
wholesale rate 1.013 0.264 1.013 0.264 1.819 *** 0.378 1.819 *** 0.378
yield curve 0.913 0.322 0.913 0.322 1.857 ** 0.558 1.857 ** 0.558
wholesale rate volatility 1.160 *** 0.253 1.160 *** 2.530 1.588 *** 3.501 1.588 *** 3501.053
bank size 1.154 0.200 1.154 0.200 1.144 0.181 1.144 0.181
herfindahl 0.732 2.318 0.732 2.318 1.094 3.523 1.094 3.523
market share  0.019 *** 0.028 0.019 *** 0.028 0.012 *** 0.019 0.012 *** 0.019
number of markets 1.026 *** 0.009 1.026 *** 0.009 1.026 *** 0.008 1.026 *** 0.008
# Observations 4862 4862 4862 4862
# failures 68 68 68 68
LR Chi(2) 199.62 199.61 178.62 178.62
Positive change hazard
wholesale rate=T-Bill 3 month rate  wholesale rate=Fed funds rate
Negative change hazard
wholesale rate=T-Bill 3 month rate  wholesale rate=Fed funds rate
 
Note: Semi-parametric estimation of the subhazards of positive and negative retail rate changes based on a sample of spells considering only changes which are not reversed 
within one week as spell “ends”. Hazard ratios higher than unity imply an increased hazard of changing the retail rate. Hazard ratios lower than unity imply a lower probability of 
changing the retail rate and thus more rigid retail rates. 43 
 

















absolute change wholesale rate 0.033 *** 0.024 0.015 *** 0.019 0.145 *** 0.089 0.346 *** 0.097
dummy for negative change 0.519 ** 0.163 0.465 *** 0.122
negative change*absolute change 0.464 0.677 1.671 1.289
dummy for positive change 1.925 ** 0.604 2.726 *** 0.711
positive change*absolute change 2.156 3.149 0.001 *** 0.001
wholesale rate 1.419 * 0.304 1.419 * 0.304 1.782 *** 0.339 1.796 *** 0.340
yield curve 1.024 0.310 1.024 0.310 1.430 0.429 1.489 0.446
wholesale rate volatility 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.999 ** 0.001 0.999 ** 0.001
bank size 0.939 0.108 0.939 0.108 0.896 0.108 0.898 0.106
herfindahl 0.736 1.529 0.736 1.529 1.048 1.940 1.077 2.013
market share  0.924 1.276 0.924 1.276 1.373 1.891 1.410 1.926
number of markets 1.013 * 0.007 1.013 * 0.007 1.016 ** 0.007 1.015 ** 0.007
# Observations 4982 4982 4982 4982
# failures 112 112 112 112

















absolute change wholesale rate 0.000 ** 0.000 0.400 0.287 0.001 *** 0.002 0.681 0.250
dummy for negative change 0.117 *** 0.051 0.145 *** 0.056
negative change*absolute change 407.952 ** 1597.595 782.421 *** 1894.928
dummy for positive change 8.535 3.703 7.735 *** 2.960
positive change*absolute change 0.000 0.001 0.000 *** 0.000
wholesale rate 1.331 0.279 1.331 0.279 2.008 *** 0.365 1.880 *** 0.350
yield curve 1.046 0.324 1.046 0.324 1.745 * 0.538 1.715 * 0.532
wholesale rate volatility 1.210 *** 2.230 1.210 2.230 1.001 *** 0.000 1.001 *** 0.000
bank size 1.059 0.117 1.059 0.117 1.029 0.118 1.024 0.118
herfindahl 0.534 1.309 0.534 1.309 0.785 1.801 0.639 1.470
market share  1.738 2.310 1.738 2.310 1.979 2.587 2.133 2.792
number of markets 0.999 0.008 0.999 0.008 1.001 0.008 1.002 0.008
# Observations 4982 4982 4982 4982
# failures 80 80 80 80
LR Chi(2) 163.17 163.17 127.05 133.33
Positive change hazard
wholesale rate=T-Bill 3 month rate  wholesale rate=Fed funds rate
Negative change hazard
wholesale rate=T-Bill 3 month rate  wholesale rate=Fed funds rate
 
Note: Semi-parametric estimation of the subhazards of positive and negative retail rate changes based on a sample of spells considering only changes which are not reversed 
within one week as spell “ends”. Hazard ratios higher than unity imply an increased hazard of changing the retail rate. Hazard ratios lower than unity imply a lower probability of 
changing the retail rate and thus more rigid retail rates. 44 
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Note: Distribution of the duration of retail rates in weeks. 45 
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Note: Distribution of the duration of retail rates in weeks. 
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Note: Distribution of the duration of retail rates in weeks. 
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Note: Distribution of the duration of retail rates in weeks. 
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Chart 5: Kaplan–Maier hazard function estimates 
 
Note: Nonparametric Kaplan–Maier smoothed hazard estimates based on samples considering only interest rate 
changes that are not reversed within one week as the ends of spells. 49 
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Note: Nonparametric smoothed hazard estimates based on samples at covariates value of zero considering only 
interest rate changes that are not reversed within one week as the ends of spells. 
 
 